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Appendix: Direct ut' i ry. :adow wages, and the imposition
of concavity Z9Abstract
The model in this paper combinea a number of desirable proper-
ties of household labor supply models. First, we adopt the Asusman-Ruud
specification so that the labor supply functions are second-order
flexible in wages. Second, the model takes into account the non-lineari-
ty and non-convexity of the budget sets due to the tax aystem and unem-
ployment compensations. Third, the sample used alao provides information
on how many hours people would like to work. Using this information we
know which houaehold members are reatricted in their number of houre
worked and employing r:tioni~ theory, the effecta of inetitutional con-
atraints on labor suppl~ aie modelled. Fourth, in the eatimation of the
model concavity of the cost function, which i s prerequisite for the use
of rationing theory, is imposed for certain rangea of exogenoua
variables.1
1. Introduction
This paper is a strictly neoclassical exercise in the modelling
of household labor supply. For each of the aspects of family labor sup-
plyl) dealt with, sufficient theory is available. Yet the implementation
ís often riddled wíth probleme and many compromisea have to be made be-
fore a workable model is obtained.
First of all we want to use flexíble functional forms in our
specifícation of the model. One of the consequences of tnis is that la-
bor supply functions ~re de- ved from cost functions or indirect utility
functions and that no clused form for the direct utility function ie
known2). This creates problems in view of the second aspect we want to
deal with. We want to allow for non-convexities in the household budget
set, and this calls for comparison of the utility of different points in
the choice set. If this 'ias t be done without recourse to a direct uti-
lity function, one needs to compute virtual wages and virtual non-labor
incomes that correspond to the point of which we want to calculate the
utility. For the indirect translog and AIDS, the computation of virtuel
wages ia a cumbersome affair. However, for the flexible system recently
introduced by Hausman and Ruud (1984), the computation of shadow wages
is fairly easy, and hence we adopt the Hausman-Ruud model for the des-
cription of household labor supply.
A third aspect we want to deal with is that the observed number
of hours worked is not just the result of the maximization of a house-
hold utility function, but is also affected by institutional constraints
and demand side factors. In the data used in the empirical analysis, we
have information on both the actual number of hours worked by hus!~and
and wife and the number of hours they would like to work (to be called
preferred hours) at their current wage rate. We assume that it is pre-
ferred hours that are the reflection of the houaehold's preferencea,
1) "household" and "family" are used a synonyms. In this paper we only deal
with complete families, i. e. with at least husband and wife present.
2) The only known flexible form derived from a direct utility function is the
direct translog, but this leada to measy expreseions.2
rather than actual hours. In addition we asaume that a reapondent in our
survey determines his or her preferred hours conditional on the actual
number of hours worked by the partner. In other worda, when husband or
wife tell us how many hours they would like to work, they assume that
the number of hours actually worked by their partner does not change.
Technically, this meana that the number of hours of the partner is ra-
tioned, so we need rationing theory to deacribe the preferred hours of
both partnera. Once again, thie requires the computation of shadow
wagea.
A fourth aspect ia the imposition of concavity, in wages, of the
cost function. The Hauaman-Ruud coat function cannot be globally concave
and at the same time maintain ita flexibílity. So if we value flexibili-
ty, the best thing we can do ia to impose concavity in a relevant range
of wages. It is ahown that thia can be done by setting an upper bound to
one of the parameters in the model.
A fifth important aspect ia to have a consistent stochastic spe-
cification. Ours ie only consiatent under special asaumptions. We dis-
cuss some aspects of the stochastic apecifícation in Section 4 and we
have to conclude that only under very stringent conditiona a consistent
and tractable stochastic specification is posaible.3
2. The Model
A household i s assumed to maximize a utility function with male
leisure, female leisure and total household conaumption as ita argu-
ments. We assume that the cost function that corresponds to maximization
of the utility function under a linear full income constraintl) is the
Gorman polar form type introduced by Hausman and Ruud ( 1984):
c(wm~wf~u) a u.exp(-Smm Bfwf) -{9fdmwm~dfwft~l(YmmtYfwf)fawmwf}, (1)
where
wm, wf: the husband's and wife's after tax wage rates
u : household utility level
9m, Bf, 9, 8m, 6f, a, Ym, Yf: parameters.
Application of Shephard's lemma yields the following labor sup-
ply functions:
~ ~
hm - 6m f gm ~ f ym wm f awf.
~ ~





u a u t 9 f dm wm df wf f~í(YmwmfYfwf) t awm wf, (2c)
~ ~
Here hm and hf are the optimal numbers of working houra (per week'} of
huaband and wife and u denotes non-labor income of the household.
As noted in the introduction, the respondents in the sample used
in our empirical work did not only provide their actual number of hours
worked per week but also how many hours they would like to work per week
at their current wage rate. The latter concept is called the number of
preferred hours of the respondent.
1) Complications are considered below.4
Since preferred hours appear to be more of a reflection of the
respondent's preferences than actual hours (which are also influenced by
demand side factors and institutional conetraints), and since we are
intereated in labor aupply, which is a reflection of these preferences,
it is preferred hours that we want to explain by means of model (2).
Since the male and female partner in a household were asked the ques-
tions aeparately it seems reasonable to assume that a respondent's
answer takes the partner's number of hours as given.
From rationíng theory (c.f., e.g., Neary and Roberts (1980),
Deaton and Muellbauer (1981)) it follows that in this case the equation
for the explanation of male preferred hours is
~r -~t -
hm ~ dm f Bm uf t ym wm f awf,
- -~
where wf and uf are defined by the equations
(3a)
-,t
uf a uf t 9 t 6m wm .4- df wf f~(YmwIDfYfwf) f awm wf. (3b)
-~ -
hf ~ df f Bf uf i. Yf wf f awm
uf f wf hf ~ u f wf hf ~
(3c)
(3d)
where hf denotes the number of houra actually worked by the female. Sub-
stitution of (3b) and (3d) in (3c) yields a quadratic equation in wf,
from which wf can be aolved analytically under certain conditions.
- - -~ Having obtained wf, computation of uf and uf from (3b) and (3d) is ob-
~
vious. See the Appendix for details. The corresponding equation for hf
is obtained analogously. Note that we implicitly assume the partners to
~
have i dentical preferences. The preferred hours equations allow hi
(i~m,f) to be negative. Negative preferred hours hi imply that the 1-th
partner prefera not to work.
The calculation of wage responses ia somewhat less straightfor-
ward in the model with rationing than without. For example, in the model
without rationing we have
~
2h
~m ~ Ym t gm(dmtYmwmfawf), (4a)
m5
~hereas with rationing we obtain, after some calculations,





yf gf Wf t yf f gf(-hftóffawm)
auf awf
3 - hf aw
m





ahm - - awf
- ~ y f 6 ( ó ' ~ taw ) t { afs (-h~fó~fY~w~-Faw-) } „~: (4d)
m
Similar expressiona can be obtained for other derivatives.
The introductíon of non-linearitiee in the budget constraint due
to a progressive income tax aoes not create any fundamental difficul-
ties. Hausman's algorithm (cf. Hausman (1979) or Blomquist (1983)) can
be applied to find the preferred number of working hours for both part-
ners in a household. A more thorny problem arises as a reault of the
non-convexities created by the operation of the social aecurity system.6
3. Non-convex Budget Sets
In view of the complexity of the social security syatem in The
Netherlands, and the limited amount of information in our sample on tax
rates and deductions, we will only pay attention to the system of unem-
ployment íneurance. In The Netherlanda, employees who are laid off
usually receive unemployment compensation, whereas people who quit their
job voluntarily do not receive compensation.
In the estimation of the model we only take into account the
non-convexity of the budget aet of índividuals who receive unemploymen[
benefita. We assume that an individual who is presently employed is not
entitled to employment benefíts if he or she quits his or her job and
that, as a result, the budget set of such an indivídual is convex.l)
Figure 1. Non-convex household budget set
1) We ignore minor notr-convexitíes caused by some pay-roll taxes.7
Figure 1 shows the budget set of a household if both partners receive an
unemployment compensatíon when unemployed. Here y denotes the house-
hold's total after-tax income, including labor income, unemployment
benefits and other sources of notrlabor income, cm and cf denote the
husbands and wife's unemployment compensation respectively. The
household's budget set consists of the single point P(hm~hf~0,
y-~acmfcf), the curves BD (hf~0) and AC(hm~0) and the "manifold" OEGF.
The assumption that an individual looses all benefits at the
moment that he or she works slightly more than zero hours is incorrect.
However, the margin~l tax n increased earnings for aomeone on unemploy-
ment compensation is cl.,se to 100X. Thus, for most recipients of unem-
ployment compensation the choice will be between working zero hours or
at least so many hours that one is in the convex part of the budget set.
From a practical point of view, our assumption therefore appears to be
harmless.
As a consequence of the non-convexity of the budget set of reci-
pients of unemployment benefits, the maximum utility (U1) in employment
without receiving a benefit has to be compared to the utility of being
unemployed (UO) and receiving an unemployment benefit. The detaila of
the calculation of UO and U1 are relegated to the Appendix.8
4. Stochastic Specification, Data, and Likelihood Function
The stochastic epecification in utility consistent rationing
modela is a delicate problem, even in the case of a convex budget setl).
In these types of models it is important to distinguish between dif-
ferent sources of random errors. Let us first consider the case where
atochastic variation in preferred houra ariaea from differences in pre-
ferences across houaeholds. One way to allow for random preferences is
to allow some parametera to vary stochastically, e.g.
m
di ~ jEl xj ~ij f Ei. 1 ~ m, f (Sa)
where xj (j~l,...,m) are obaerved characteriatics that are thought to
influence the household's preferences (like family composition) and the
error term ei represents unobserved sources of preference variation.
If the d s are random, then (3) implies that wm, wf, um and
uf are random as well. Assume, for instance, that em and Ef (and conse-
quently dm and df) are normally distributed. Since m, wf, u and uf are
~ ~
nonlinear functions of the 6's, the joint dístribution of hm and hf is
then non-normal and computationally intractable. The ó's also appear in
the expressions for U~ and U1 (cf. Appendíx) in a non-linear way, so
that it is basically impossible to derive the joint diatribution of U~
and U1. Even if we would content ouraelves to obtain densities of obser-
vable variablea entirely through numerical methods, we face the problem
that a prerequisite for these densities to be proper onea is the exís-
tence and uniquenesa of the ahadow wagea defined by equationa such as
(3b)-(3d).This can only be guaranteed if the cost functíon is globally
concave. The Hausman-Ruud cost function can only be globally concave
if
sm ~ gf ' 0, in which case flexibílity is loat.
Similar problems arise in the case where random preferences are
íntroduced through shifts in hours, starting from a direct utility func-
tion of the form
1) Some problema have been diacuased before by Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986).9
U ~ u(hIDem,hf-e1,Y)
(see McElroy (1985)). A specification like this would make it necessary
to use hi-ei instead of actual hours hi (í~m,f) in computing shadow
wages and thus would yield stochastic shadow wages. The same holda if
actual hours are measured with error.
In view of these problems we have adopted a pragmatic solution.
We allow the d's to depend on observed characteríatica only, í.e.
m
di 3 ~E1 xj ~i~
iam, f
so that shadow wagea are non-random.
~
Let Uli be the utility of working max (O,hi) hours by the i-th
partner without unemploymeni ~ompeneation and let U~i(ci) be the utility
if the person does not wor~c, but continues to receive an amount ci as
unemployment compensation. We have Uli-UOi(0) ~ 0 so that we can omit
the util.ity comparison for people without unemployment compensation. For
these people, we write the stochastic version of the model as
~ -~ -
hi - di ~- Si vj f Yi wi } awj~
hi - hi f ei, if hi f Ei ~ 0,




u j s y~ f 9 t di wi f 6 j w~ t~e(YiwifYjwj) -F~ awi wj, (6d)
-~ -
h~ a~j uj f Y~ w~ f dj f awi~
v~ f h~ w~ - u f hj w~.
(6e)
(6f)
i,j E {m,f}; j ~ i,10
where hi is the preferred number of hours reported by respondent i. The
error terms can either repreaent measurement errors or optimization er-
rors on the part of the individual.
Assuming absence of optimization errora, the choice to work or
not (or rather to look for a job or not) for an individual receiving an
unemployment benefit ci is determined by Uli-~01(ci); if
Uli-UOí(ci)
~ 0, the number of houra these people would like to work is
described by (6a) and (6d-6f). For theae people the data set we use only
tells us whether they are looking for a job or not, and not their pre-
ferred number of hours. Therefore, for an individual receiving an unem-
ployment benefit we omit the hi equation and write the stochastic ver-
sion of the model as
vi s Uli-UOi(ci) } ni
zi s 1 if vi ~ 0
if vi ~ 0. zi ~ 0
where zi takes the value 1 íf the i-th partner is seriously looking for
a job and 0 otherwise. The random variable ~i can represent measurement
error or optimization error on the part of the individual.
This means, that we have not only ignored the poasibility of
atochastic preferences, but we have also assumed that the individual is
completely certain about his or her hourly wage rate if he or ahe de-
cides to accept a job. Assuming a non-trivial distribution of offered
wage ratea would again lead to etochastic shadow wages and is computa-
tionally intractable.
Due to the deaign of the questionnaire used in the survey, the
information on preferred numbera of houre hm and hf has only been col-
lected for individuals who actually work at least 15 hours per week.
Individuals who have a job, but are working less than 15 hours are only
asked whether or not they are seriously looking for a job. If the answer
ie no, preferred houra are taken equal to actual hours. If the answer is
in the affirmative, it is assumed that preferred houra exceed actual
hours (This only applies to four cases in the sample. The assumption
that theae respondents want to work more hours is based on other ques-
tiona in the questionnaire).11
We asaume ( Em,ef,nm,nf) to follow a multivariate normal distri-











An asterisk indicatea ~hat the covariance does not appear in the likeli-
hood function for ~ e ~- ant sample, so that it cannot be estimated.
Because of the amall number of observations on people receiving an un-
employment benefit (see below) we impose cov (em,nf) ~ cov (ef,nm) ~ 0
and var (rim) - var (nf).
The contributior.s L to the likelihood by households in the dif-
ferent groups as well as t:e sample composition are given in Table 1.
Here f is the joint density cf el and e2, ~ and ~ are the standard nor-
mal dis~ribution and density function respectively.12
Table 1. Likelihood contributions
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Explanation: hi : actual hours of work.
vi - Uli-UOi ~
z. - 1 if the individual is seriously looking for a job,
z~ - 0 otherwise. i
b..- 1 if the individual receives an unemployment compensation,
bi ~ - 0 otherwi se.14
Table 2. Sample Statistics
mean atandard min max number of
male preferred hours 37.60
actual hours (all males) 39.77
actual hours (working
males only) 42.29
before tax wage rate 14.97
after tax wage rate 11.74
unemployment benefit 357.70
(recipients only)






before tax wage rate 14.18










6.38 20 70 489
7.66 4.98 55.87 520
3.72 4.95 29.48 520





12.20 2 42 194
5.72 3.41 23.26 520
5.12 3.06 21.82 520
71.59 50.83 184.11 3
non-labor household income 80.62 122.54 0 927.41 520
log (family size) 1.200 0.349 0.693 2.303 520
dummy children ~ 6 years old 0.317 0.466 0 1 520
Explanation:
hours: working hours per week
wage rates: in Dfl. per hour worked
benefita: in Dfl. per week
non-labor income: in Dfl. per week, not including unemployment benefits.15
The data used stem from a labor mobility aurvey conducted ín The
Netherlands in 1982. In the estimatíon, data on 520 householda have been
Pmployed. Some sample statistics are given in Table 2.
According to Table 1, there are only six males who receive unem-
ployment compensation and state that they are not looking for a job.
Most male recipients of unemployment compensation claim to be looking
for a job. Since job hunting is a prerequisite for getting unemployment
compensation, it may very well be that some respondents who would rather
not work have not revealed their true preferences. Consequently the job-
search activities of the unemployed may be overestimated. As a result
our estimation reaul~~ mav ~ biased in favor of a preference for work.
The before tax wsge rates in Table 2 are predicted wages on the
basis of a wage equation with log(age), log(age)-squared and education
as predictors. For males and females separate wage equations have been
estimated, using Heckman's two-stage procedure (Heckman (1979)).16
5. Empirical results
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates. With respect to the
statistical significance of the parameters, we observe that Sm ("the
male non-labor income effect") and yf (representing (the largest part
of) the female own wage effect) are significantly different from zero,
whereas Bf, a and ym are not. The variables concerning family composi-
tion play a significant role in the female hours equation but not in the
male houra equation.
The estlmatea of ym, yf and a yield a positive definite matrix
Y a
A~[á Y]. The poaitíve definitenese of the matrix A ís crucial ín
m
our derivation of conditiona for concavity of the cost function (see
Appendix).
To impose concavity of the cost function in wages in a relevant
region of the (hm,hf,y) apace and the (wm,wf,u) space, the parameter 9
has been restricted, i.e. an upper bound in terms of other parameters in
the model hae been aet to 9(see Appendix, inequalities (A.15) and
(A.30); it turns out that condition (A.30) ia binding in eatimation)
such that concavity is guaranteed in all data points.
To illuatrate the reaulting regíon of concavity of the cost function,
Figure 2a presents, for a family without children, the region ín the
epace of wm, wf and u where the cost function is concave (other family
compositiona yield only minor changes in the area of concavity). The
region of concavity is bounded from above by the paraboloid (see Appen-
dix) drawn in the figure. It appears that the cost function ís concave
for almoat any reasonable value of wm, wf and u. To fix ideas: a weekly
after tax unearned income of 2,500 guildera amounts to an annual income
of approximately U.S. ~ 52,000 (2.5 guilders is taken as approximately 1
U.S. dollar); an after tax wage rate of 60 guildera per hour amounts to
about ~ 24 per hour. Figure 2b ehows the corresponding region of conca-
vity in (hm,hf,y)-space. This region (outside the paraboloid, see Appen-
dix, eq. (A.9) and (A.6)) appears to contaín all reasonable values of
hm, hf and y.
The estimatea of sm and sf have the expected sign, indicating
that both male and female leiaure are normal goods. As far as the otherii
narameters are
hard to gíve.
concerned, a direct economic interpretation is mostly













































Explanation: the parameters 6m and 5f have been made dependent upon ad-
ditional exogenous varíables as follows:
2
si ~ ~~0 xj bij
(i~m,f)
x0 ~ 1
xl ~ log (family size)
1 if there are children in the family younger than six
x2 a {0 otherwise
1) Covariance matrix of the parameter estimates is estimated as
{E alogL~ (e) alogLi (8)~}-1
~ ae ae
Estimate
2) The estimate of 9 attains its upper bound (due to the ímposition of
concavity) so no standard error could be computed.Figure 2a. The region of concavity of the estimated cost function in
(ID,wf,u)-space
The region inside (i.e. below) the paraboloid is the region of concavity
in the (wm,wf,u) space.Figure 2b. The re on of concavit of the estinated cost function
(hm,hf,y)- sPace
The region outside ( i.e. below) the paraboloid is the region of concavi-
ty in (hm,hf~Y)'space.20
The economic meaning of the estimates will be brought out more clearly
by the presentation of graphs and elasticities.
In Figure 3 a through d family labor supply functions have been
drawn for a family without children as a function of before tax wage
rates. In each case the remaining variables, are set at their sample
means. We distinguiah between short run (the partner ia rationed at his
or her current number of hours) and long run (the partner is not ratio-
ned) labor supply functions. In each of the four figures two short run
labor aupply functions are drawn: one for the case where the actual num-
ber of hours worked by the partner equals the sample mean (hf~ 22.62 or
hm-42.29) and one for the case where the partner does not work at all.
Zt is remarkable, that long run labor supply is always (a little bit)
lower than short run labor supply.
Figure 3a ahowa a backward bending male labor supply function
implying that the negative income effect dominates the poaitive own wage
effect. Figures 3b and 3c demonstrate the expected negative relationship
between one's preferred number of hours and the partner's wage rate, but
the effects are amall. Figure 3d ahows that female labor supply is for`
ward bending. The own wage impact ia much larger for the wife than for
the huaband. Figure 3d alao reveala the working of the tax system. The
piece-wise linear progressive tax syatem leada to jig-sawed responses of
preferred hours to the own before-tax wage rate. The reason for this is
that each time an individual is at a kink in the budget constraint, she
wants to stay there if we change the before-tax wage rate a little bit.
To stay at a kink with an increasing before-tax wage rate entails a re-
duction of work effort. The downward eloping parts in Fig. 3d are hence
hyperbolas. The same kind of non-differentiabilities is in principle
also preaent in Fígure 3a, but in this case the hyperbola parts are so
amall that the drawing cannot reveal them. This is caused by the very
small male own wage effect. The difference in own wage elasticities is
borne out by Fígure 4 where some indifference curves are depicted.
Figure 4a shows a few indifference curves upon which the husband's deci-
eion is based if his wífe works hf ~ 22.62 hours; it 1s easy to aee that
a change in the male wage rate only has a very small impact on the opti-
mal number of male working houre. In Figure 4b, where the wife's indif-
ference curvea are drawn if the husband works h- 42.29 hours a week,
m
the (own) wage impact is much larger. Similar figures could be drawn forzi
different family compositions. The main difference would be a atrong
downward shift in all female labor supply functione ( due to the negative
estimates for bfl and 6f2, the parameters that represent the impact of
family size and the presence of children younger than six respectively
on the wife's labor aupply). As a result (predicted) preferred hours of
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lony run
partner works Fi. hours
partner does no~ work
Figure 3. Preferred houra ae a function of before tax hourly wage rates







Gt ~~ - 22. 62
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Figure 4. Some indifference curves for a family wíthout children if the
number of working hours of one spouae are fixed.2S
The rooting of our model in neoclasaical theory allowa us to
calculate the compensating variation (cv) and the deadweight loss (dwl)
that results from the taxes on labor income. The compensating variation
is the lump-sum the household neede in the presence of taxes to be ae
well off as it would have been without taxes. The deadweight losa is the
difference between the compensating variation and the taxes paid by the
household after being reatored to the original utility level. We calcu-
late this as a percentage of the taxes paid (cf, e.g., Hausman (1981)).
We calculate the compensating variation and the deadweight loss for dif-
ferent wages, setting all other variablee equal to theír sample mean.
Table 4 shows the familiar ~attern of an increase in deadweíght loss if
market wages rise, w~ich ~s a result of the progressivity of the tax
system. The average magnitude of the deadwetght loss ia modest. For com-
parison,
Table 4. Compensating variati~a and deadweight loss
Exogenous compensating Tax Deadweight
variables variation loss
xl x2 wm wf
2 0 14.97 14.18 108.80 106.68 1.99
2 0 29.94 28.36 430.10 392.38 9.61
4 0 14.97 14.18 98.01 97.76 0.26
4 0 29.94 28.36 357.19 354.04 0.89
4 1 14.97 14.18 101.30 101.02 0.28
4 1 29.94 28.36 359.21 358.95 0.07
Explanation:
xl and x2 are defined in Table 3.
wm and wf are the husband's and wife's before tax hourly wage ratee. We
have used the sample means of these valuea (see table 2) and twice the
sample means.
Compensating variation and tax are expressed in Dfl per week.
Deadweight loss ~(Compensating variation-tax)~tax x 100X.26
Blomquiat (1983) reports an average deadweight loss of approximately 20X
of the income tax in Sweden. The explanation for the difference may lie
primarily in the differences in wage elasticities. In our model, be-
havioral reaponsea to wage changes tend to be modest, so that taxes do
not influence behavior very much.27
5. Concluding remarks
The basic idea of neoclassícal modele is, of course, that deci-
síon making units maximize a utility function under conatrainta. Much of
recent work in labor supply has been directed towarda a better modelling
of these constraints. In order to deal with certain kinda of conatrainta
(like corner solutions and ratíoning), integrability conditiona have to
be satisfied. If, for example, the coet function ia not concave in a
certain region of (wm,wf,u) apace, a calculated female shadow wage wf
that corresponda to a point in this regíon doea not have a theoretically
well-defined meaning. Tnus imposition of theoretícal reatrictiona on the
model is a condítio s;~e ~ a non for the uae of ahadow wages.
It is not possible to test the validity of the concavity re-
striction imposed, simply becauae if the restriction does not hold the
model does not make senae.
Perhaps the most imp~rtant problem left is to find a realiatic
and consistent stochastic specification. Our st~chastic apecification ia
only consistent with the assumption that preferred houra auffer from
measurement or optimization errore. Since the poasíbility of ineasurement
errors in actual houra or random preferencea ia ruled out by our speci-
fication, it can hardly be called realiatic. Perhapa the aize of inea-
surement errors in actual hours will be small, so that we are juatified
in ígnoring this source of randomnesa. But it is quite unlikely that all
variatíon in preferences is correctly described by the equation in Table
3 and our choice of xj's. As it appears almost impoasible to model
random preferences conaistently within a flexible apecification, the
best thing to do may be to inveat more time in an inveatigation of de-
terminants of aystematic variation of preferencea acroae householda; in
other words to extend the list of xj's in Table 3.28
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A~ e p ndix: DIRECT UTILITY, SHADOW WAGES, AND THE IMPOSITION OF CONCAVITY
Dírect utility
The non-convexity of the budget set makes it necessary to compare the
values of the direct utility function in different points. We ahall
determine the utility level in some given point (hm,hf,y), where y is
the household's income:
(A.1) y ~ u f wm hm ~- wf hf.
We use the following i~ta ~on:
B:' (Sm~sf)~
A:
l Ym a 1 a Yf
k:~ (hmóm,hf-df)'
w:~ (wm,wf)'
Given t~, hf and y, we first want to find ( shadow-)wages w an3 corre-
sponding (virtual) non-labor i ncome u: ~ y- wm hm - wf hf satísfying
~
(A.2) k 3V SfAw
(A.3)
~
u~ u t 6 f(6m,6f) w t~ w'Aw ~~ w'Aw - w'k f y f 0
Inserting w and y in the indirect utility function then yields the uti-
lity of the point (hm,hf,y).
From now on, we asaume that the matrix A is posítive definite.
Equations (A.2) and (A.3) can then be rewritten as
~
(A.4) w- A lk s-v A B
(A.5) u~ a~(w-A lk)' A(w-A lk) -~ k' A lk t y t 9.30
~
Substituting (A.4) into (A.5) yields a quadratic equation in u:
(A.6)
2
v~ ~~ u~ s ~ Á lg - i~ k' Á lk f y f 9
~
and if u is known (A.4) implies that w is given by
~
(A.7) w ~ Á1(k-u B).
So, ahadow wages w and corresponding non-labor income u can be deter-
mined iff the quadratic equation (A.6) has a real solution. This is the
case if
(A.8) D:~ 1 f S' A ls (k'A-1 k-2(yfA)) ~ 0
To have theoretical eignífícance a solution (w,u) ahould satisfy
the addítional requirement that the cost function is concave in wages
at (w,u), i.e. the matrix
~
B:- u S S' - A
must be negative semi-definite. Since A ia assumed to be positive defi-
nite, it is easy to see, that this condition ia equivalent to
(A.9)
~
v B' A 16 c 1.
~
Clearly, if S- 0, (A.6) and (A.7) yield a unique solution (w,u ) that
satisfies (A.9). If B~ 0 and inequality (A.8) holds, (A.6) and (A.7)
~
yield (at most) two solutions (w,u ) and only the amalleat of them
satisfies (A.9):
(A.10) u~ '(B'A ls)-1 -~(B'A 16)-2 f(B'A 16)-1 {k'A lk-2(yfg)}~~e
(A-11) w ' A 1(k-u~6)
(A.12) v ~ y - w h - m m31
The utility level is given by
~
(A.13) U(hm~hf.Y) ' ~(wm.wf~V) ' u exp(9'w).
Concavíty in (hm,hf,y)-epace
Given that A~ 0, (A.9) gives a necessary and sufficient condi-
tíon for concavity of the cost function at a point in (wm,wf,u)- apace.
In order to arrive at an equivalent condition in (hm,hf,y)-space one
simply subetitutes (A.10) into (A.9). It is easy to see that this yielda
(A.8). Thus the neceasary - d sufficient condition for a real solution
for the shadow wages is ~imply the concavity condition in (hm,hf,y)-
space. If one wanta to impose concavity for a certain region S of
(t~,hf,y)-space, this can be done conveniently by restricting the para-
meter 9,
such that.
(A.14) 9 c min {~(B'A 16)-1 f~ k' A lk -y},
S
assuming B~ 0(for B-0 guarantees concavity). To give one particularly
simple example: (A.14) holds for all hm and hf and for all incomes y not
exceeding a given y0 if
(A.15) 9 c ~(S'A 18)-1 - y0.
Shadow wages if one spouse is rationed
The shadow wage and corresponding virtual non-labor income ne-
ceasary to determine an individual's preferred hours conditional on the
actual number of houra the partner works can be derived in a way that ia
similar to the derivation of (A.10)-(A.12), although a lack of symmetry
makes vector notation less fruitful.
Corresponding to given hj, wi, wj and u(í,j E{m,f};isj) we muat find
w~, uj, and hi such that:32
-~ -
(A.16) h~ ~ B j u j f Y j w~ f acwi f d~
(A.17) u~ f hj w~ s u f h~ w~
(A.18) uj - u~ t e f di wi f bj wj f~(Yiwi}Yjw~) f a wi wj
-~
(A.19) hi - ai uj f Yi wi f aw~ t ai
Equationa (A.16)-(A.18) imply
(A.20) a2 wj f alwj f a0 ~ 0
where
ao --hj f s~(h~wjfufetdiwif~ yiwi) f awi t dj
al ~ Y~ f sj(-h~tdjtawi)
a2 - ~ gj y~.
If (A.20) admits no real solution for w~, no ahadow wage can be deter-
mined and hi cannot be found. Equation (A.20) ia solvable iff
D:~ 9j(-h~td~-awi)2 f Yj - 2S~ Y~(h~wjfuf6fdiwif~ Yiwi) ~ 0
Given a solution w of (A.20), one immediately finds values of
- -~ ~
u~, u~ and hi by usíng (A.17), (A.18) and (A.19). The solutíon is fea-
sible only if the cost function is concave i n wages at
(wi,wj,v(wi,w~,u~)). Assuming A is positive definite, this concavity
condition can be written as in equation (A.9):
(A.21) uj S' A-ls t 1
If B~ - 0, the unique solution of (A.20) is given by
(A.22) wj a (hj - awi - d~)~Y~ss
and aubstitution of (A.22) and (A.17) into (A.18) yields
(A.23) u~ S 9-1. di wi f~ yi wi -~(h~-awi-d~)2~Yj
From (A.23) it is easy to check concavity conditíon (A.21). Note that
global concavity i s only guaranteed if Bi ~ 0 as well.
Now let us conaider the case Sj ~ 0. If D ~ 0, (A.20) yields (at
most) 2 real solutions for wj, gíven by
(A.24) w~ ~- S~1 f(hj-d~-awi)~yi t(BjYj)-1 dD.
.~
The corresponding val~~s c v~ are
(A.25) uj - 9j2 Yj t sj2 rD.
It is straightforward to sho that the positive definítenesa of A im-
plies
(A.26) 9j2 Y~ (9'A 16) ~ 1
From (A.21), (A.25) and (A.26) it follows that a feasible solution,
satisfying concavity exiats if
(A.27) dD ~ Y~ - s~(6'A
16)-1
In this case, the feaaible solution is unique:
(A.28) wj - -Bjl f (hj-dj-awi)IY~ f (B~Yj)-1 rD.
and ~~ and hi can be found from (A.17)-(A.19)
Concavity in (hj,wi,wj,u)-space
As before, concavity for a certain range of valuea of h~, wi, w~
and u, can be imposed by aetting an upper bound to the parameter 9.34
If B~ s 0, the upper bound immediately follows from (A.21) and (A.23).
If s~ ~ 0, we can rewrite condition (A.27):
(A.29) 9 c(Uthjwjfdiwitdiwif ~ Yiwi) f~ Y~1(-h~fójfawi)2 f~Y,
where
V~ '~ Yjl Sj(S'A 16)-2 f (S'A 16)-1.
In estimating the model, we want to set an upperbound to 9(in terms of
the other parameters in the model) which guarantees (A.29) to hold at
all data-points. There are two things we have to take into account.
Firstly, 6i (i~1,2) is allowed to vary acroas households, as are the
observed marginal wage rate wj and actual hours hj. We write
óik),
w(k) and h(k) (k~1,...,520) to indicate household k. Secondly, due to
~ j
the progreasive tax system, wi is not a priori known and v contains an
unknown component (virtual non-labor income due to the tax system for
spouse i). Now let u0 ~ 1064.41 (the maximum sample-value of non-labor
income includíng virtual income due to taxes) and let w0 a 4.94, wl i
m m
20.41, w0 ~ 2.84 and wf a 21.82 (the sample minima and maxima of male
and female marginal wage ratea). A sufficient condition for (A.29) to
hold at all data-points ie now given by
(A.30) 6 c max {v0 f h~k) wjk) f áik) wg f~ Yi(wg)? i, j E{M,~}, itj,
kE{1,...520}, gE{0,1}} t ~,.i
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